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NOTES
"No Frills" Justice': North Carolina Experiments
With Court-Ordered Arbitration
Public criticism of the inefficiencies and injustices2 of the American legal
system has burgeoned in recent years. 3 Frequent complaints include allegations
that the present judicial system is "too costly, too painful, too destructive, [and]
too inefficient for a truly civilized society."' 4 Although governments do subsidize
many costs of running the courts, "full use of the courts requires expensive lawyers and much time of disputants. ' '5 "The net result may be that the courthouse
doors are . . . often closed for all practical purposes to the vast majority of
individuals and businesses." 6 Thus, courts are ineffective in discharging their7
vitally important function of protecting citizens' private rights and concerns.
Unfortunately, this failure to provide adjudication services 8 is accompanied by
an unwelcome rise in government expenditures necessary to maintain existing
court systems. 9 Whatever the causes for the serious weaknesses in conventional
litigation, 10 the present trends towards greater cost and delay, if unchecked,
1. J. ADLER, D. HENSLER & C. NELSON, SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE
PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 60 (1983) [hereinafter SIMPLE JUSTICE].

2. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1986).
3.

NORTH CAROLINA BAR FOUNDATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A TASK FORCE REPORT 9

(1985) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (report on dispute resolution compiled after two years of
research, study, interviews, and visits to programs).

4. Speech by former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association Meeting
(Feb. 12, 1984), excerpt reprinted in 28 BOSTON B.J. May-June, 1984 (appears on cover); see also
Friedman, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 WASH. LAW. 4 (1987) (noting litigants are increasingly
frustrated by excessive delays and escalating costs of adjudication).
5.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC

POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9 (1983) [hereinafter PATHS TO JUSTICE] (Report of the

Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy).
6. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
7. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 9; see infra note 145.
8. Alschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need
for a Two-Tier Trial System for Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1811 (1986).
9.

E. JOHNSON, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS FOR ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESS-

ING CIVIL DISPUTES 3 (1978). Johnson noted the six principal deficiencies in the judicial system: (1)

an overload of cases; (2) delay; (3) inaccessibility of the courts for many litigants and disputes; (4)
economic costs ofjudicial resolution of disputes for disputants and government; (5) lack of equity in
the results achieved through dispute processing; and (6) undesirable psychological outcomes from
the court processing of disputes. Id. at 2-3; see also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supranote 1, at 1 (emphasizing
problems of court congestion, delays in obtaining trial, and rising public expenditures).
10. Much has been written about the "litigation explosion." Some commentators posit that
current litigation problems have resulted from an unprecedented increase in the number of citizens
resorting to litigation. For instance, former Chief Justice Warren Burger has commented that "mass
neurosis ... leads people to think courts were created to solve all the problems of society." N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1985, at A21, col. 4.
Others, however, do not see the volume of cases filed as causing current problems. Instead,
difficulties have resulted from "complexit[ies], prohibitive costs, and delay in using the courts."
PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 7; see generally Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know andDon't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious andLitig-
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"will cause the average citizen to tire, run out of money and finally turn away

from our courts, cynical and disillusioned." 11
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is increasingly viewed as a solution

to help solve court problems. 12 Within the wide range of ADR techniques and
processes, 13 court-ordered arbitration 14 is gaining widespread support as an ad-

junct to traditional litigation.' 5 Advocates see court-ordered arbitration as
"promising simple, fast, and inexpensive adjudication to litigants and a means of
reducing judicial workloads and controlling public expenditures for civil court
administrators."

16

The usual form of court-ordered arbitration involves the re-

ferral of eligible cases (usually those under a set dollar amount and within certain subject matter limits) to mandatory, pretrial arbitration. This arbitration,
typically conducted by one or more practicing attorneys, consists of an informal
hearing and an award. The hearing is nonbinding, and either party may demand
ious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 61-69 (1983) (providing overview of development of "litigation
explosion" literature).
11. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 1 (1984).
12. Edwards, supra note 2, at 668; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. ADR is defined
as all methods for settling disputes other than by court adjudication. See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra
note 5, at 36. The basic premise of the ADR movement is that
[society] cannot and should not rely exclusively on the courts for the resolution of disputes.
Other mechanisms may be superior in a variety of controversies. They may be less expensive, faster, less intimidating, more sensitive to disputants' concerns, and more responsive
to underlying problems. They may dispense better justice, result in less alienation, produce
a feeling that a dispute was actually heard, and fulfill a need to retain control by not handing the dispute over to lawyers, judges, and the intricacies of the legal system.
Id. at 1. For a discussion of possible problems with ADR, see Weinstein, Warning: Alternative
Dispute Resolution May Be Dangerous to Your Health, 12 LITIGATION 5 (1986).
13. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text for an overview of the ADR taxonomy; see
generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985) (providing basic
overview of all ADR processes).
14. Court-ordered arbitration also is known as "court-annexed arbitration," "judicial arbitration," and "court-administered arbitration." NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION ISSUE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM 2 August 1985 [hereinafter
FORUM]. This Note uses the term "court-ordered arbitration."
15. Id. at 3. Chief Justice Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court characterized the role of
court-ordered arbitration as an "adjunct" to the court system. Id. at 5. "Adjunct implies an exten.
sion or an arm of the courtroom system, and this indicates cooperation, or the idea of working
together." Id. "[U]se of the word 'alternative' may be misleading (in the context of court-ordered
arbitration) because it connotes a certain degree or an element of antagonism or separateness ......
Id.; see also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supranote 1, at I (court-ordered arbitration as one of the most attractive alternatives to traditional litigation).
16. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 1. Many court-ordered arbitration programs seek the
following objectives:
* Reduce congestion on the civil trial calendar by diverting and disposing of cases through
arbitration;
* Reduce (or stabilize) court costs by reducing judicial time spent on the civil caseload;
* Reduce time to disposition by providing an expedited process for arbitration-eligible
cases and by removing these cases from the trial queue, thereby reducing time to trial for
other cases;
* Reduce litigation costs for parties;
* Improve court access for diverse users by reducing the time and expense required and by
providing a simpler and, perhaps, fairer form of dispute resolution.
Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-AdministeredArbitration, 69 JUDICATURE
270, 275 (1986).
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a jury trial. 17
On January 1, 1986, court-ordered arbitration commenced on an experimental basis in three North Carolina judicial districts.1 8 This pilot program is
being conducted pursuant to the Rules for Court-Ordered Arbitration in North
Carolina, which the North Carolina Supreme Court originally promulgated on
August 12, 1987.19 Similar rules are now in effect for the United States District
20
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.

This Note examines North Carolina's experimental court-ordered arbitration program. It discusses court-ordered arbitration's place in the ADR taxon-

omy, outlines the history of this alternative to traditional adjudication, and
reviews the background of the North Carolina pilot program. The Note de-

scribes how court-ordered arbitration works in North Carolina, and analyzes
the experiment through discussion of ADR objectives and the limited studies
made of other state programs. The Note concludes that North Carolina's pilot

project is well designed and incorporates positive features from other court-ordered arbitration programs.

To discuss North Carolina's experiment with court-ordered arbitration, it is
necessary to identify court-ordered arbitration's place in the ADR taxonomy

and to understand the common characteristics of this type of program. ADR
may be divided into four primary dispute resolution models-negotiation, medi-

ation, arbitration, and adjudication. 2 1 These processes may be conceptualized as
a continuum ranging from the most informal to the most "rulebound and coer-

cive. '"22 Negotiation is at the former end of the continuum and court adjudica23
tion is at the latter.
17. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1839. See infra notes 37-57 and accompanying text for a more
detailed analysis of program characteristics.
18. Walker, Experimental Court-Annexed Arbitration Comes to North Carolina,N.C. ST. B.Q.,
Fall 1986, at 11. The three districts were the Third District (Carteret, Craven, Pamlico, and Pitt
Counties); the Fourteenth District (Durham County); and the Twenty-ninth District (Henderson,
McDowell, Polk, Rutherford, and Transylvania Counties). Id. The first arbitration hearing was
conducted on March 9, 1987. As of September 30, 1987, 124 hearings have been held. Telephone
interview with Frank C. Laney, Dispute Resolution Coordinator with the North Carolina Bar Association (Jan. 4, 1988) [hereinafter Jan. Laney Interview].
19. In re Pilot Program of Mandatory, Nonbinding Arbitration, N.C. Sup. Ct. Order filed Aug.
28, 1986, printed in 317 N.C. Appendix (1986). The supreme court ordered a revision of these rules
on March 4, 1987. In re Pilot Program of Mandatory, Nonbinding Arbitration, N.C. Sup. Ct. Order
filed Mar. 4, 1987,printed in 319 N.C. Appendix (1987). The most notable changes in the rules have
been the method of calculating the time period in which a hearing must begin and the method for
continuing a hearing. See Preface to N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R., 319 N.C. Appendix. This Note refers
to the revised rules of March 4, 1987 and discusses revisions of the original rules as appropriate.
20. Walker, supra note 18, at 11.
21. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 7.
22. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 4.

23. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 4-5. Differing ADR techniques are placed on this
continuum through analysis of their characteristics. The characteristics identified by the Institute
for Dispute Resolution include: (1) whether participation is voluntary; (2) whether parties represent
themselves or are represented by counsel; (3) whether decisions are made by the disputants or by a
third party; (4) whether the procedure employed is formal or informal; (5) whether the basis for the
decision is legal or involves some other criterion; and (6) whether the settlement is legally enforceable. Id. Goldberg, Green, and Sander employ somewhat differing characteristics to examine "primary dispute resolution processes." S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 8.
The characteristics of ADR techniques they identify are: (1) "voluntary/involuntary;" (2) "bind-
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Negotiation, the most common form of dispute resolution, is a voluntary
process that is usually informal and unstructured. 24 The disputants themselves
determine the process and the criteria for decisionmaking;
decisions occur with25
out the assistance or intervention of a third party.
Mediation also is a voluntary process in which an impartial third party is
brought in to "assist the disputants in arriving at their own solution."' 26 Similar
to negotiation, mediation is informal and occurs under private auspices. 27 The
role of the mediator is not to coerce the disputants, 28 but instead to help them
form a better functioning relationship. 29 In addition to "[building] among disputants a sense of accepting and owning their own ... settlement," mediation
may "provide an opportunity to deal with [the] underlying issues in a dispute"
30
and establish acceptable ways of handling future disputes.
Adjudication is a formal dispute resolution process in which "disputants
present proofs and arguments to a neutral third party who has the power to
hand down a binding decision, generally based on objective standards." 31 In its
most common forms-judicial and administrative hearings-adjudication is a
compelled procedure decided by a judge or a hearing officer in accordance with
accepted rules of law. 32 Closely related is the arbitration process, which is "less
formal, proceeds under more relaxed rules, and may be binding or non-binding." 33 In traditional arbitration, parties submit their dispute to a self-selected
third party who renders a binding decision after summarily hearing arguments
and evidence. 34 This private alternative to court adjudication has been widely
used to resolve commercial and labor disputes.3 5 In the commercial-contractual
context, arbitration typically refers to a voluntary process entered into by muing/non-binding;" (3) role, if any, of a third party; (4) "degree of formality;" (5) "nature of the
proceeding;" (6) "outcome"-a "principled decision" as opposed to a "mutually acceptable agreement;" and (7) "public/private."
24. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 7-8.
25. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 5; S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note
13, at 7-8. For a discussion of negotiation techniques, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WiTHouT GIVING IN (1983).
26. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 7.
27. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 7-8.
28. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11. In mediation, the mediator has no power to
impose an outcome on disputants. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 91.
29. See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
Fuller defines the "central quality" of mediation as "its capacity to re-orient the parties toward each
other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of
their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Id.
30. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 14; see generally E. SANDER, MEDIATION: A SELECT
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1984) (bibliography of mediation literature).
31. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 149.
32. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 5.
33. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 5.
34. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. Several private arbitration systems exist, such as
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS). S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 189.
35. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & E. SANDER, supra note 13, at 189.
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36
tual consent of the parties, and the outcome is "usually binding."
Court-ordered arbitration differs from traditional arbitration in several
ways. 37 First, court-ordered arbitration is imposed on the disputants by operation of statute or court rules and never is voluntary. 3 8 "By requiring litigants to
arbitrate, the courts hope to reach a greater number of cases than might volunteer for the process." 39 Second, the outcome of court-ordered arbitration is not
binding; either participant may ask for a trial de novo. 40 Third, unlike traditional arbitration in which the disputants choose a neutral third party, the court
may impose an arbitrator. 4 1 Finally, court-ordered arbitration is a "method of
dealing with civil litigation subsequent to the filing of the case while traditional
42
arbitration occurs prior to the institution of the law suit."

In addition to common characteristics that differentiate court-ordered arbitration from traditional arbitration, there are key features that characterize individual court-ordered programs. First, although most courts limit court-ordered
arbitration to claims seeking money damages, 43 the jurisdictional limits (determined by a monetary ceiling) vary among programs. 44 "The central argument
is the belief that these are
for limiting arbitration's jurisdiction to smaller cases
45
most likely to be disposed of through arbitration."
36. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19. Arbitration by mutual consent has been used in
North Carolina for many years. Walker, supra note 18, at 11. Walker notes:
In 1925 the Federal Arbitration Act, now 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, was enacted; it was revised in 1947. In 1927 the General Assembly enacted the first Uniform Arbitration Act. In
1970 Congress passed legislation, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08, to implement the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Three years later the General
Assembly enacted the revised Uniform Arbitration Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 1-567.1 [to] 1-567.20.
The Federal Arbitration Act and the state Uniform Act are practically identical in their
terms.
Id.; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20 (1985); see also C. FOSTER,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA (1986) (outlining

terms of federal and state acts described by Walker). For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of all the ADR forms noted, see PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 12-14.
37. Levine, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 J.L. REFORM 537 (1983).
38. Hensler, supra note 16, at 271. "Court-administered arbitration programs may be established by statute, by supreme court rule, or by local court rule." Id.
39. P. EBENER, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY 49 (1981).
40. FORUM, supra note 14, at 3; Levine, supra note 37, at 537. Because disputants are required
to arbitrate claims that meet program criteria, all programs provide the right of trial de novo to
preserve parties' seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Constitutional challenges to court-ordered
programs have proven unsuccessful. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 49.
41. Levine, supra note 37, at 537. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text for a discussion
of arbitrator selection in the North Carolina program.
42. Levine, supra note 37, at 537 (emphasis added).
43. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE 7 (1985).
44. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 52. State jurisdictional limits vary considerably, with the
lowest set at $3,000 and the highest at $50,000. The limits for federal programs are higher than for
state programs. The highest jurisdictional limit for a federal program is the $150,000 ceiling in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ("Middle District Program"). P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supranote 43, at 8-10. For a complete comparison of state
program characteristics, see id. at 9-10 (Table 3). For a discussion of the characteristics of federal
programs, see Center for Public Resources, Ten Courts Try Arbitration, ALTERNATIVES, Oct. 1986,
at 16-18. See also Levin & Golash, Alternate Dispute Resolution in FederalDistrict Courts, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985) (describing ADR programs currently in use in federal courts).
45. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 52. Ebener notes that if cases cannot be solved by arbitration,
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The second key feature of court-ordered programs is the timing of case

assignment. 4 6 Case assignment refers both to the "point in the pretrial process"

at which cases are assigned and to the method of assignment. 47 Programs vary

in how they structure this feature. It is clear that the timing and method of
assignment affects a program's cost as well as a program's effectiveness in reduc48
ing delay.

A third variable that shapes any court-ordered arbitration effort is the identity, selection, and compensation of the arbitrator personnel. 49 An arbitration
hearing typically is conducted by a practicing lawyer, a retired judge, or a panel

of lawyers. 50 Most state programs "require a minimum number of years experience as an attorney to qualify as an arbitrator." 5 1 Selection of arbitrators varies
among state programs. Most states allow parties to select their arbitrators or

have input in the selection process. 5 2 Arbitrator quality inevitably affects participants' confidence in the court-ordered arbitration process and the perception
'53
of "having one's day in court."

The fourth key feature characterizing court-ordered arbitration programs is

the utilization of a disincentive to discourage appeals from the arbitration
award.5 4 For court-ordered programs to achieve the goals of reduced cost and

delay, the number of cases actually tried de novo must be fewer than the number
of cases that would be formally tried in the absence of the arbitration program.55

In keeping with this objective, most programs incorporate disincentives, which

''usually involve payment by the appealing party of the arbitrator's fees and
costs of arbitration."' 56 However, appeal rates alone are an inadequate measure
of program success because "many more cases request trial de novo than are
'57
ever actually tried."
such a diversion program makes no sense. If cases eventually must be tried whether arbitrated or
not, then arbitration has only succeeded in adding cost and delay. Id. at 52-54.
46. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 54.
47. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 54.
48. See E. ROLPH, INTRODUCING COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: A POLICY MAKER'S
GUIDE 21-28 (1984).
49. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 8. For a discussion of the issues concerning arbitrator qualification and selection, see Hensler, supra note 16, at 277-78.
50. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1839.
51. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23.
52. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
53. E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 28-30; see also SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1,at 77-80 (complaints about arbitrators' qualifications). The Middle District Program emphasizes the use of a
highly qualified arbitrator; this provides litigants with a more meaningful experience. Speech by
Trevor Sharp, Magistrate, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina,
Workshop: The Law and Practice of Court-Annexed Arbitration in the North Carolina State and
Federal Courts (Jan. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Sharp Speech].
54. FORUM, supra note 14, at 3-4.
55. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6; Levine, supra note 37, at 541; see infra notes 200-04 and
accompanying text.
56. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 11; see also E. ROLPH,supra note 48, at
26-27 (discussing problems of imposing an appeal disincentive and its administration).
57. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 55. To ascertain the success of a program, therefore, it is
"important to examine the number of cases that are actually tried rather than the rate of requests for
trial de novo." Id. The reasons for the disparity between requests for trial de novo and actual trials
is unclear. Ebener speculates: "The [difference] may [occur] because the request for trial frequently
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Court-ordered arbitration has expanded significantly in both state and federal courts since Pennsylvania instituted the first program in 1952.- s The greatest increase in program expansion occurred between 1978 and 1984, when the
number of jurisdictions with arbitration programs more than tripled. 59 As of
late 1985, ten federal districts were experimenting with court-ordered arbitra61
tion, 60 and eighteen states had adopted the device.
Expanded federal court experimentation with court-ordered arbitration began in 1983, when the Administrative Office of the United States Courts embarked on "an ambitious experiment with [this] procedure in ten federal district
courts."' 62 After expressing interest in the program, the United States District

Court for the Middle District of North Carolina was selected as one of the ten
districts. On October 24, 1984, the court promulgated Rules for Court-Annexed
Arbitration 63 pursuant to its rulemaking authority in Title 28 of the United
65
States Code6 and Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Simultaneous with the propagation of the Federal Rules, the North Carolina Bar Association formed the Task Force on Dispute Resolution "to investigate alternative methods to litigation to resolve disputes between North Carolina
citizens."' 66 In June 1985, the bar association published its Task Force Report,
which included the establishment of a pilot project of court-ordered arbitration

in three judicial districts. 67 On the last day of its 1985 session, the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation enabling the North Carolina Supreme
acts as an additional leverage in settlement negotiations. Or sometimes an attorney may automatically file trial de novo requests to protect himself from subsequent complaints by his client, or to
delay enforcement of the award." Id.
58. FORUM, supra note 14, at 3-4. For a detailed history and description of the Pennsylvania
program, see SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8-12. See also Walker, Court-OrderedArbitration
Comes to North Carolinaand the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 901 (1986) (providing an analysis of court-ordered arbitration in North Carolina and the United States).
59. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 4. For a complete overview of the implementation of state programs, see id. at 5-6 (Table 2).
60. Center for Public Resources, supra note 44, at 16 (outlining the ten districts chosen by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the federal experiment).
61. Center for Public Resources, North CarolinaApproves ArbitrationProject, ALTERNATIVES,
Nov. 1985, at 9; see also FORUM, supranote 14, at 4 (map plotting geographic locations of state and
federal programs). Apparently, two more states have adopted court-ordered arbitration, bringing
the total to 20. See Walker, supra note 58, at 901-02.
62. Center for Public Resources, supra note 44, at 1.
63. M.D.N.C. R. 601-11. The rules are reproduced in ANNOT. R. OF N.C. 574-80 (1985). The
Middle District Program, like the North Carolina experimental program, is based on the "adjudication" model of court arbitration. Under the adjudication model, an arbitrator renders a judge-like
decision after hearing the facts of the dispute as presented by the interested parties. Sharp Speech,
supra note 53. The purpose of a hearing in the Middle District Program is to reach an award that
can serve as a final order. Id. This model contrasts with the "negotiation" model used by some
federal courts. Id. In the negotiation model, arbitration is viewed as a settlement technique. Hearings are conducted before the parties have engaged in much discovery. Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
66. Letter from Larry B. Sitton, Chairman, Dispute Resolution Committee, & Allan B. Head,
Executive Director to the Judges and Lawyers of the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District (Dec. 14, 1986)
[hereinafter Bar Association Letter] (disseminating information about court-ordered arbitration and
soliciting assistance and cooperation).
67. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-11.
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Court to devise rules 68 for "an experimental, pilot program in three judicial districts selected by the Court, of mandatory, nonbinding arbitration of all claims
for money damages of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) or less."' 69 At the re-

quest of the supreme court, the Court-Ordered Arbitration Subcommittee of the
Dispute Resolution Committee of the bar association drafted procedural rules
for the pilot program. The supreme court adopted the proposed rules on August
12, 1986.70

The Rules for Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina 7' (North Carolina Rules) became effective in the three participating judicial districts on January 1, 1987. Cases filed in these districts after that date, "or those referred by the
appropriate court, or those referred by the parties' agreement," are subject to
72
arbitration.

North Carolina Rule 1 outlines the types of actions subject to arbitration
and excepted cases. Under the basic rule, all actions filed "requesting a monetary recovery of $15,000 or less"-exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys'

fees-are subject to court-ordered arbitration. 73 The $15,000 limit was set because of a belief that "such claims are generally simpler and more amenable to
an expedited process." 74 The North Carolina
Rules also extend jurisdiction to
75
appeals from the judgments of magistrates.

North Carolina Rule 1 also excepts 61aims involving more than $15,000 and
claims for other than monetary relief.76 The exceptions include "injunctive or
68. Center for Public Resources, supra note 61, at 9.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37 (1986). The enabling legislation provided that all claims fitting
the criteria were subject to arbitration, but specifically directed the supreme court to ensure that "no
party is deprived of the right to a jury trial and that any party dissatisfied with the arbitration
award" be allowed to receive a trial de novo. Id. Additionally, the legislation directed an evaluation
of the program "for a reasonable period of time" and a report of the results of the evaluation to the
general assembly. No state funds were to be used to implement the program. Id. Although the
unwillingness of the general assembly to fund the state experiment could have proved fatal, the bar
association was able to raise private funds. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 66.
70. Bar Association Letter, supra note 66. The proposed rules were co-authored by Carmon J.
Stuart, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Court-Ordered Arbitration, and George K. Walker, Professor of Law at the Wake Forest University School of Law. Walker, supra note 18, at 19. "The
Committee and Sub-committee included representatives of constituencies within the bar ...,minorities, age groups, the judiciary, the General Assembly, and the law schools." Id. Five drafts were
prepared and submitted to numerous individuals; suggestions received were incorporated into the
final draft. Id.
71. 319 N.C. Appendix (1987).
72. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 9, 319 N.C. Appendix at 12; Walker, supra note 18, at 12.
73. TAsic FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 20 (emphasis added); accord N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB.
R. 1(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 1. N.C. Rule 1(a) provides:
All civil actions filed in the trial divisions of the General Court of Justice which are not
assigned to a magistrate and all appeals from judgments of magistrates in which there is a
claim or there are claims for monetary relief not exceeding $15,000 total, exclusive of interest, costs and attorneys' fees, are subject to court-ordered arbitration under these rules ....
Id. The comment to this rule notes that the $15,000 jurisdictional limit applies only to the claim
actually asserted. Id. at 2 comment. A recovery for more than $15,000 would be possible in an action
brought under a statute allowing for treble damages. Id.; see also N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 4(c), 319
N.C. Appendix at 8 (award may exceed $15,000).
74. Bar Association Letter, supra note 66; see N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. l(a), 319 N.C. Appendix
at 2 comment.
75. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 11.
76. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. l(a)(l) - (7), 319 N.C. Appendix at 1.
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declaratory relief, family law cases, title to real estate, wills and decedents estates, or summary ejectment." 77 Another exception may occur if a claim inthe claimant certifies in the
volves an unspecified monetary recovery 7and
8
pleading that the claim will exceed $15,000.

Because the North Carolina program generally determines the suitability of
cases for court-ordered arbitration from the ad damnum clause of the pleadings,
the cases are self-selected rather than judicially assigned to arbitration. 79 Nevertheless, the North Carolina Rules provide that, at any time before trial, the court
may order a case into arbitration "if it finds that the amount actually in issue is
$15,000 or less, even though a greater amount is claimed."' 80 Further, the North
Carolina Rules provide that
[t]he court may exempt or withdraw any action from arbitration on its
own motion or on motion of a party made not less than 10 days before
the arbitration hearing and a showing that: (i) the amount . . . exceed(s) $15,000; (ii) the action is excepted from arbitration under Rule
l(a); or (iii) there is a strong and compelling reason to do so. 81
Randomly selected cases routinely are exempted for inclusion in a control group
of cases that are compared to arbitrated cases to evaluate the pilot program
82
effectively.
Selection of cases for court-ordered arbitration, notification of parties, and
setting of the hearing date are the responsibilities of an arbitration coordinator
who works in the trial court administrator's office. 83 When a complaint is filed,
the clerk examines the ad damnum clause and makes a preliminary determination whether the case might be subject to arbitration under North Carolina Rule
1. If the case appears to be suitable for arbitration, the filing party is notified
77. Walker, supra note 18, at 12. "Class actions, special proceedings, and cases where an unspecified amount claim required by N.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (amended effective January 1, 1987) is
asserted [also] are excluded." Id.
78. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1(a)(6), 319 N.C. Appendix at 1. False certification may subject
the claimant to sanctions under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.5 (1986), N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a), or State Bar
disciplinary action. 319 N.C. Appendix at 2 comment. Also excludable by certification are cases
that are "companion or related to similar actions pending in other courts with which the action
might be consolidated but for lack of jurisdiction or venue." N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARa. R. l(a)(7), 319
N.C. Appendix at I.
79. The Bar Foundation Task Force Report noted: "Allowing litigants to value their own cases
minimizes court involvement and promotes administrative efficiency. It eliminates delays which
would be caused by having others value the cases. It allows the parties some flexibility to determine
whether court-ordered arbitration is desirable." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
80. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1(c), 319 N.C. Appendix at 2.
81. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. l(d)(l), 319 N.C. Appendix at 2.
82. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. l(d)(2), 319 N.C. Appendix at 2; see infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
83. Telephone interview with Frank C. Laney, Dispute Resolution Coordinator with the North
Carolina Bar Association (Jan. 26, 1987) [hereinafter Jan. Laney Interview]. Drafters of the North
Carolina program emphasized administrative considerations; their goal was to place no burdens on
the court. Speech by Kathy Shuart, Trial Court Administrator, Fourteenth Judicial District, Workshop: The Law and Practice of Court Annexed Arbitration in the North Carolina State and Federal
Courts (Jan. 28, 1987) [hereinafter Shuart Speech]. Additionally, the arbitration administrators relieve arbitrators from any incidental arrangements for hearings. NORTH CAROLINA BAR AssOCIATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITTEE, BENCHBOOK FOR ARBITRATORS 2 (1987) [hereinafter
BENCHBOOK]; see also N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(e), 319 N.C. Appendix at 11 (delegation of nonjudicial functions will "conserve judicial resources and facilitate effectiveness of these rules").
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that the case is a potential arbitration case; the same notice is stapled to the
paperwork that is issued to the defendant. 84 The arbitration coordinator then

reviews all complaints marked as potential arbitration cases to ensure there are
no false positive or false negative cases. 8 5 The coordinator tracks eligible cases
and notifies eligible parties not selected for the control group that they are in
arbitration.86

Under the current plan, definitive notification to parties not selected for the
control group that they will participate in court-ordered arbitration occurs

within twenty days of filing. 87 Under the North Carolina Rules as originally

adopted, courts were required to set a date for arbitration which would ensure

that hearings commenced within ninety days of filing. 88 However, revised
North Carolina Rule 8(b)(1) stipulates that a court "shall schedule hearings with
notice to the parties to begin within 60 days after: (i) the docketing of an appeal
from a magistrate's judgment, (ii) the filing of the last responsive pleading, or
(iii) the expiration of the time allowed for the filing of such pleading." 8 9
The North Carolina Rules allow parties to "file a stipulation identifying
their choice of an arbitrator" selected from a court list of qualified arbitrators. 90
Parties must make this selection within twenty days from the date of the docketing of an appeal from a magistrate's judgment or from the date the last pleading
was filed or could have been filed. 91 If parties do not select their own arbitrator
or cannot agree on an arbitrator within the specified time, the court will appoint
92
an arbitrator, chosen at random from its list.
An arbitrator in the North Carolina pilot program must have been a mem-

ber of the North Carolina State Bar for at least five years. An additional re84. In its revision of the North Carolina Rules, the supreme court expanded the Rules notification provision. Rule 8(a) reads: "The court shall designate actions eligible for arbitration upon the
filing of the complaint or docketing of an appeal from the magistrate's judgment and give notice of
such designation to the parties in all cases not exempted for comparison purposes pursuant to Rule
l(d)(2)." N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 10.
85. Jan. Laney Interview, supra note 83; Shuart Speech, supra note 83.
86. Jan. Laney Interview, supra note 83; Shuart Speech, supra note 83. The Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is responsible for conducting the pilot program evaluation. The Institute of Government provides the arbitration coordinators with
"computer assigned slots" in which to place all cases. Thus, no clerk or administrator affects the
selection of the control group. Jan. Laney Interview, supra note 83.
87. Jan. Laney Interview, supra note 83; see Form, Notice of Case Selection for Arbitration,
reproduced in BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 35.
88. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(a), 317 N.C. Appendix at 10.
89. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(b)(1), 319 N.C. Appendix at 11. The supreme court also incorporated into Rule 8 a provision addressing the circumstances under which a party requests the
hearing to be scheduled, rescheduled, or continued on a date after the time allowed in Rule 8(b)(2).
Because the goal of these rules is to expedite disposition of claims, a hearing may be scheduled for, or
continued to, a later date "only by the court before whom the case is pending upon a written motion
and a showing of a strong and compelling reason to do so." N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(b)(2) &
comment, 319 N.C. Appendix at 11.
90. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 2(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 3. The parties have the right to choose
one arbitrator from the list "if they wish to do so," and the burden of taking the initiative to select an
arbitrator is on the disputants. Id. at 4 comment.
91. Id. at 3. Revised Rule 2(a) reads in part: "Unless the parties file a stipulation identifying
their choice of an arbitrator on the court's list within the first 20 days after the 60-day period fixed in
Rule 8(b) begins to run, the court will appoint an arbitrator, chosen at random from the list." Id.
92. Id.
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quirement of eligibility is approval by the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge
and the Chief District Court Judge. 93 These relatively high standards for arbitrators reflect the belief of the Subcommittee on Court-Ordered Arbitration that
the success or failure of the North Carolina program depends to a great degree
on the "abilities and dedication" of the arbitrators. 94 Arbitrators are paid a fee
of seventy-five dollars by the court for each hearing, which they receive when
they file their awards with the court. 95 The bar association acknowledges that
the fee "represents an amount lower than that given to arbitrators in most jurisdictions."'96 Inherent in the decision to offer a low remuneration to arbitrators
was "a decision that members of the bar should accept [such] service... as part
'97
of their pro bono responsibilities."
The single arbitrator 9 8 in North Carolina's court-ordered arbitration experiment acts as "a sole juror in finding the facts, as a judge in applying the law and
as an arbitrator in rendering an award." 99 Because the North Carolina program
is based on an adjudication model, the arbitrator is empowered to make judgelike decisions. Arbitrators are not mediators, whose primary function is to encourage settlement.1 ° North Carolina Rule 3(g) illustrates this fact, which
grants arbitrators the authority of a trial judge in governing the conduct of hearings.10 1 In addition, arbitrators have judicial immunity for actions in an arbitration proceeding to the same extent as a trial judge.10 2 After conducting a
hearing, an arbitrator may not be deposed or called as a witness concerning that

hearing. 103
The goal of ensuring that program hearings are informal, limited, and expe93. Id. As with many aspects of the pilot program, each participating district is free to establish its own mechanism for compiling a list of arbitrators. In the Fourteenth District, for example,
the local bar association was very active in selecting arbitrators. It established a committee of five
attorneys, who selected 45 attorneys based on their experience and temperament. The committee
called all of the prospective arbitrators and asked them to serve. The district court judge and the
chief judge were given a list of 30-35 arbitrators willing to serve. Fifteen arbitrators were chosen
from this group to comprise the court list of qualified arbitrators. Shuart Speech, supra note 83.
94. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 1.
95. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2(c), 319 N.C. Appendix at 3-4. "The Comment to State Rule 2
notes that state arbitrators may be able to schedule three cases a day, and State Rule 3(n) contemplates that the typical hearing will last one hour unless timely application for extension is filed with
the arbitrator." Walker, supra note 18, at 14.
96. Bar Association Letter, supra note 66.
97. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.

98. North Carolina court-ordered arbitration hearings are conducted by a sole arbitrator. See
N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2 & comment, 317 N.C. Appendix at 3-4. Other state programs have a
panel of three arbitrators. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 9-10 (Table 3).
99. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 1.
100. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 1. The Middle District Program also is based on the adjudication model. Some federal courts view arbitration as a settlement technique. In these programs
hearings are conducted before discovery; parties in the informal hearings summarize their cases and
the arbitrator attempts to devise a resolution. Sharp Speech, supra note 53.
101. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARa. R. 3(g), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5. This grant excludes the power to
punish contempt, which should be referred to the court. Id.
102. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(f), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9.
103. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(e), 317 N.C. Appendix at 9. The revised North Carolina Rules
state that an arbitrator may not be deposed or called as a witness "in a trial de novo, or any subsequent civil or administrative proceeding involving any of the issues in or parties to the arbitration."

Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

ditious is reflected by the procedures outlined for discovery, admission of evidence, and testimony of witnesses. 1° 4 North Carolina Rule 3(b) requires that
parties exchange information at least ten days prior to the hearing date. Parties

should exchange "(1) lists of witnesses that parties expect to testify; (2) copies of
documents or exhibits that parties expect to offer in evidence; and (3) a brief
statement of issues and contentions."' 105 Documents exchanged pursuant to this
rule are considered authenticated; thus, no further authentication is needed
when such documents are received into evidence at the hearing. 10 6 The arbitrator may, however, refuse to receive documents that have not been properly ex-

changed "if to do so would, in the arbitrator's opinion, constitute unfair,
prejudicial surprise."' 0 7 In addition, the North Carolina Rules encourage brev-

ity by permitting written agreements "to rely on stipulations and/or statements,
sworn or unsworn, rather than a final presentation of witnesses and documents,

for all or part of the hearing."' 1

8

Finally, the discovery period is limited by the

requirement that hearings must begin sixty days from the filing of the last pleading, or the date when such pleading could occur. 10 9
Arbitration hearings under the North Carolina Rules are designed to be

"streamlined trials"' 10 and are limited to one hour. 1 A courtroom setting and
a procedural style of "dignified informality" are utilized in order to enhance
litigants' perceptions of "fairness" and of "having their day in court. ' 112 Proce-

dural details and the manner of conducting a hearing are "left largely to the

individual arbitrator's discretion." ' " 3 The arbitrator is "empowered and authorized" to administer oaths. Furthermore, "[w]itnesses may be compelled to testify under oath.., and produce evidence by the same authority and to the same

extent as if the hearing were a trial."'1 14 The North Carolina Rules provide that
no official transcript of a hearing shall be made, but the arbitrator may permit
104. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(b)-(e) & comment, 319 N.C. Appendix at 4-5; TAsK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 19; see Walker, supra note 18, at 14.
105. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 4-5.
106. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(c), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5. North Carolina Rule 3(c) provides,
however, that the party against whom the exchanged document is entered "may subpoena and examine as an adverse witness anyone who is the author, custodian or witness through whom the
document might otherwise have been introduced." Id.
107. Id.
108. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5; Walker, supra note 18, at 14.
109. In his speech, Magistrate Sharp described the period of discovery in the Middle District
Program as "concentrated." Sharp Speech, supra note 53. Although discovery is more concentrated
in arbitration, the Middle District Program does not anticipate less discovery than in other cases of
similar complexity. Discovery can be accomplished within the allotted time if attorneys begin early
and plan. Problems that occur in concentrated discovery are usually "sequencing" problems. Id.
Magistrate Sharp noted that concentrated discovery, followed shortly thereafter by a hearing, may
be a time-saver for attorneys. When there are lengthy delays in cases actually coming to trial, attorneys often may have to refamiliarize themselves with a case in which discovery occurred months or
years before. Because arbitration hearings immediately follow discovery, this problem is reduced.
Id.
I10. Walker, supra note 18, at 16.
111. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(n), 319 N.C. Appendix at 6. The arbitrator may determine that
more time is necessary to ensure "fairness and justice to the parties." Id.
112. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 3.
113. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 3.
114. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(e), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5.
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parties to record the hearing at their expense. 115
Hearings commence with a brief, preliminary conference between the arbitrator and counsel,' 16 or a short opening statement by counsel 17 (or parties if
pro se), during which the arbitrator is free to ask questions.1 8 The preliminary
conference or opening statements provide the arbitrator an opportunity to identify the issues in the case and to define and resolve procedural matters to expedite the hearing. 1 9 Following the opening statements or conference, plaintiffs
and defendants present their cases. Direct and cross-examination of witnesses is
permitted. 120 The law of evidence does not apply to arbitration hearings, except
as to privilege, but is "considered as a guide toward full and fair development of
the facts."' 12 1 North Carolina Rule 3(h) directs the arbitrator to consider all
evidence presented and to give such evidence "the weight and effect [the arbitrator] determines appropriate."' 122
"After rebuttal (if any) parties may make brief closing statements." 123 The
arbitrator declares the hearing concluded when all the evidence has been
presented and any arguments the arbitrator permits have been completed. An
arbitrator may solicit or permit post-hearing briefs, but not evidence. The par124
ties must submit these briefs within three days after the hearing has ended.
Awards must be "in writing, signed by the arbitrator, and filed with the court
within 3 days after the hearing is concluded or the receipt of the post-hearing
briefs, whichever is later."' 125 The North Carolina Rules make no provision for
115. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(k), 319 N.C. Appendix at 6. Any record of a hearing made by
an arbitrator is privileged and not subject to discovery. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(e), 317 N.C.
Appendix at 9.
116. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 4.
117. Walker, supra note 18, at 16.
118. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 4.

119. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 4. The Benchbook for Arbitrators notes that an arbitrator
may
[i]dentify and define the essential issues in the case; clarify existing stipulations and understandings and bring about others which may obviate some testimony; discover differences
between the parties' settlement positions and possibly help narrow them; raise and resolve
potential procedural problems, such as the authenticity of documents; and lay down any
special "ground rules" in the particular case, such as time limitations under Rule 3(n) and
permitted recording under Rule 3(k).

Id.
120. Walker, supra note 18, at 16.
121. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(h), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5. The Benchbook for Arbitrators
suggests that "[b]efore presentation of evidence begins, the arbitrator may... remind counsel of...
Rule 3(h) in the interest of avoiding unnecessary time consuming objections and 'laying ground' or
foundation for testimony." BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 4. The rules for the Middle District
Program do not suggest using the rules of evidence as a guide. See M.D.N.C. R. 607(g).
122. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(h), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5. The "arbitrator may receive evidence in any form that would be received by a court, special master or administrative tribunal."
BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 4. Additionally, "the Rules do not preclude observation or examination of places or property outside the hearing room ...." Id.
123. Walker, supra note 18, at 16. The Benchbook for Arbitrators suggests that a brief closing
argument is beneficial for the arbitrator and the litigants, "who may gain a better understanding of
their positions and thereby be more willing to accept the arbitrator's judgment and not.., ask for a
trial de novo." BENCHBOOK,supra note 83, at 5.
124. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB.R. 3(o), 319 N.C. Appendix at 6; BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 5.
125. N.C. Cr.-ORD. ARB. R. 4(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 8. The North Carolina Rules state
that the arbitrator is not required to support the award with findings of fact, conclusions of law, or
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reconsideration or modification of awards after filing. In the case of an award
made against a party who failed to obtain a continuance of a hearing and who
failed to appear for reasons beyond his control, the court, not the arbitrator,
orders a rehearing. 126 It is important to note that the arbitrator's responsibility
127
for a case ends with the filing of an award.
Any party not subject to judgment by default who is dissatisfied with the
hearing award has a right to have a trial de novo.' 28 To receive a trial de novo,
the dissatisfied party must file a written demand with the court and serve the
demand on all parties within thirty days after the arbitrator's award has been
filed. 1 29 This thirty-day "cooling off" period allows parties to "assess positions
and potential for settlement or for improving their situations by full trial."' 130 A
party demanding trial de novo is required to pay a filing fee equal to the arbitrator's compensation and expenses, although such a fee is waived for an indigent
party.1 31 The court holds the filing fee and returns it to the demanding party
only "if there has been a trial in which, in the trial judge's opinion, the demanding party improved [his] position over the arbitrator's award. Otherwise, the
filing fee shall be forfeited .... ,132
If neither party demands a trial de novo, a case may be terminated in two
ways. First, a party may file a stipulation of dismissal or consent judgment at
any time before the court enters judgment on the award.' 33 Second, if the parties do not terminate the case by agreement and there is no demand for a trial de
novo within thirty days of the filing of the award, the court enters a judgment on
34
the award.'
Program evaluation, an important component of court-ordered arbitration
in North Carolina, was mandated by the enabling legislation.1 35 The evaluation
opinions. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 4(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 8. However, a brief explanation of the
reasons for the award may make the decision more acceptable to litigants. BENCHBOOK, supra note
83, at 6.
126. Walker, supra note 18, at 16; see also N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(j), 319 N.C. Appendix at 5
(addressing failure to appear, defaults, and rehearing).
127.

BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 6.

128. The dissatisfied party who files for a trial de novo is entitled to a trial "conducted as if there
had been no arbitration proceeding." N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(c), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9. A ban
on the evidence of a previous arbitration hearing includes prohibiting any reference to the arbitration
in the presence of the jury. Id. In addition, "[n]o evidence that there have been arbitration proceedings or any fact concerning them may be admitted in a trial de novo, or in any other proceedings,
without the consent ofall parties to the arbitration and the court's approval." N.C. CT.-OaD. ARB.
R. 5(d), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9.
129. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 8.
130. Walker, supra note 18, at 16. In both the state program and the Middle District Program,
the demand for a trial de novo will not serve as a demand for a jury trial. Id. Likewise, a demand for
a jury trial will not serve as a demand for a trial de novo. Id.
131. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9; Walker, supra note 18, at 17-18.
132. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9.
133. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(a), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9.
134. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 10. The comment to this rule notes
that an award entered as a judgment is not appealable, "because there is no record for review by an
appellate court." Id. at 10 comment. The right of appeal is waived by failure to demand a trial de
novo. Id.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37 (1986). For a discussion of measuring the success of courtordered arbitration, see E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
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component is a rigorous, controlled design research study "with cases randomly
assigned to an Arbitration Group (ordered into arbitration) or a Control Group
(not ordered into arbitration)." 136 This controlled study allows a comparison of
outcomes for the two groups.1 37 The North Carolina arbitration program is
apparently the first state program to be evaluated by a controlled study. 138
Absent the benefit of controlled evaluations of any state programs similar to
North Carolina's pilot program, it is impossible to determine whether courtordered arbitration in North Carolina can expect to achieve the desired outcome
of "[resolving] many civil disputes ...in a manner that is quicker, more expeditious, and more easily understood than that presently in use, without compromising the quality of justice enjoyed by the parties. ' 139 Several programs,
however, have operated long enough for studies to be made from existing
data. 14 0 On the basis of these and other analyses suggesting areas for evaluation,

it is possible to highlight some important issues surrounding court-ordered arbitration and to make limited observations concerning North Carolina's pilot
program.
Various analytical approaches to an ADR program are possible, but inevi-

tably the "bottom line" is a cost-benefit analysis1 41 on which courts or legislative

bodies base their decisions on whether to extend or abandon a program. Thus,

the first goal of court-ordered arbitration often is to provide "prompt, relatively
inexpensive, fair and less formal resolution of a great many civil cases."' 14 2 Con-

comitant with this goal, however, is a second goal of any ADR program to
"[preserve] the procedural and substantive rights of citizens involved in law
suits."' 14 3 A third, closely related goal of court-ordered arbitration is to ensure
satisfaction of litigants, the legal community, and the courts. Without this apIN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center rev. ed. 1983), and Bedlin & Nejelski, Unsettling Issues About Settling Civil Litigation: Examining "Doomsday Machines," "Quick
Looks" and Other Modest Proposals,68 JUDICATURE 9 (1984).
136. Bar Association Letter, supra note 66.
137. Bar Association Letter, supranote 66. The study examines any influence of court-ordered
arbitration on the following factors:
(1) The time from filing of a case to its disposition;
(2) The rate of termination of cases by other types of disposition, such as settlement or
dismissal, before or after arbitration;
(3) Amount of recovery;
(4) Cost to court and litigants;
(5) Degree of satisfaction of attorneys and litigants;
(6) Costs and benefits to litigants; and
(7) The effect of attorney vs. non-attorney representation during arbitration.

Id.
138. See Bar Association Letter, supra note 66. The state evaluation component is similar to
that of the Middle District Program being conducted by the Private Adjudication Center at the
Duke University School of Law under the direction of Dr. E. Allen Lind, Senior Behavioral Scientist
with the Institute for Civil Justice. Id.
139. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
140. See, eg., FORUM, supra note 14, at 3-4 (discussing the Pennsylvania program); SIMPLE
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 8-12 (same).
141. See Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 135, at 10.
142. FORUM, supra note 14, at 3.
143. FORUM, supra note 14, at 3; PATHS TO JUSTICE, supranote 5, at 4. The Ad Hoc Panel on
Dispute Resolution and Public Policy noted that "[ADR] must be fair and just to the parties to the
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proval, an ADR program is liable to fail. 144
An ADR program that does not, first, adequately ensure a citizen's vindica-

tion of private rights is an unacceptable alternative to traditional adjudication. 14 5 Therefore, an important issue surrounding the implementation of a
court-ordered arbitration program is its effect on the quality of justice available
to litigants. Although arbitration is a form of adjudication it is, nonetheless, a
substitute for the traditional "combination of settlement and trial prevailing in
most civil courts" 1 46 that has evolved into the American standard ofjustice. An
important goal of research must be to determine whether the substitution of

court-ordered arbitration for traditional standards of justice changes the distribution of litigation outcomes.147
The study of Pittsburgh's court-ordered arbitration program conducted by
the Institute for Civil Justice provides a preliminary indication of the effects of

arbitration on justice. In their analysis of outcomes, researchers examined the
results of arbitration hearings and the outcomes of appeals from these awards.

Neither the arbitration awards nor the appeals from the awards showed a bias in
favor of any group of litigants or cases. 148 The study did suggest that one possible effect on outcomes was that neither plaintiffs nor defendants emerged as
clear winners. 14 9 The researchers observed that "[a]lthough defendants fre-

dispute, to the nature of the dispute, and when measured against society's expectations ofjustice."
PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 13.
144. See Glick, The PoliticsofState-Court Reform, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 3031 (P. Dubois ed. 1982); see also Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 135, at 19 ("Three ... areas for
program evaluation are (1) time and money invested, (2) justice and due process, and (3) participant
satisfaction.").
145. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1809-10. Alschuler writes of the importance of adjudication
to individuals:
Adequate adjudicative services are central to the maintenance of a civilized society. This
lesson is not confined to criminal proceedings. The vindication of private rights, no less
than punishment for wrongs against society, is an essential part of the sensed social compact. By assuring individuals that claims of injustice will be heard, considered, and judged
on their merits, the judicial branch of government performs a distinctive service. More
than other governmental agencies, courts reinforce a sense of individual worth and individual entitlement. The promise that every person's claims of injustice will be taken seriously
tends to lessen alienation and to foster an awareness of community obligation. When it is
alleged that one member of a community has wronged another, someone must be available
to hear both sides and to provide an impartial, authoritative resolution of the dispute.
Id. at 1810. In addition to individual needs for a fair method of resolving private disputes, ADR also
must "give expression to the community's sense of justice .. " PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at
13.
146. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 31.
147. Hensler, supra note 16, at 272. Hensler notes:
Supporters of court administered arbitration programs do not generally expect to change
case outcomes. Instead, the distribution of outcomes prevailing prior to establishing an
arbitration program is frequently viewed as the benchmark for assessing arbitration's effect
on equity, and a program is viewed as successful if it does not perceptibly alter that distribution to the advantage or disadvantage of any of the major participants in the system.
Id.
148. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6; SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 90-91. Cf E. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 13-16 (declining to speculate on effects of arbitration on outcomes). In
their report on the study of three federal programs, Lind and Shapard note the difficulty of measuring this data. They conclude that no analysis of the effects on the quality of justice is possible
without a controlled study. See id.
149. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 59.
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quently lost at arbitration.., the amount awarded to the plaintiff by the arbitrators was often less than what the plaintiff had demanded before the hearing." 150
1
Therefore, defendants seemed to benefit from contesting a demand. 51
One possible exception to the finding that no group is at a disadvantage in
court-ordered arbitration is the pro se litigant.152 In the Pittsburgh study pro se
parties "appeared to be systematically disadvantaged" when they faced opponents who were represented by counsel. 153 Because this disadvantage is endemic
to the present legal system, pro se litigants may be no worse off under courtordered arbitration and actually may fare better because of the informal, simplified hearing procedure. 154 However, as a result of the adversarial nature of arbitration and the ability of many litigants to afford counsel, it seems that court15 5
ordered arbitration is not a "People's Court."
Another criticism of court-ordered arbitration is that litigants with smaller
civil disputes may be relegated to "second-class" justice. 156 However, the Pennsylvania study and others conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice found a
high level of satisfaction among litigants and no perception of second-class status.1 57 Both individual and institutional disputants shared this positive attitude
toward court-ordered arbitration. 15 8 Furthermore, the reduction in trial delays
offered by court-ordered arbitration may be of special benefit to the small-claim
150. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 58.
151. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 58.
152. A pro se litigant is a party who appears in her own behalf in court and does not retain a
lawyer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
153. Hensler, supra note 16, at 275.
154. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6. Prose litigants may be benefited by court-ordered arbitration,
because the procedure is more informal and more comprehensible to those without legal education.
The Benchbook for Arbitrators in the North Carolina pilot program emphasizes that "[a]rbitrators
have special opportunities to show their concerns for the rights of people and their dedication to the
simple and fair administration of justice by the manner in which they treat pro se litigants."
BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 3.
155. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supranote 1, at 92-93. For example, the researcher's study of the California court- ordered arbitration program indicated that it would be "difficult, if not impossible, for the
average individual to bring a case in arbitration without legal assistance." Id. at 93; see also id. at 8384 (offering suggestions to help pro se litigants).
156. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 75.
157. Hensler, supra note 16, at 275.
158. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 83. Litigants interviewed were specific in their adjudication needs:
Individual litigants who bring cases to arbitration in Pittsburgh have very simple requirements: They want a speedy, inexpensive procedure that provides a full hearing of
their dispute before an impartial third party, and an opportunity to challenge if the outcome proves unacceptable. They are generally indifferent to the qualifications of the thirdparty adjudicators as long as they are neutral, and to the setting in which the hearing is
held. But they appreciate the informality and privacy of the arbitration process. Most of
those we interviewed found that their requirements were met.
Institutional litigants who depend upon the arbitration program for routine resolution
of large numbers of civil suits also have rather simple requirements. They too want a
speedy, inexpensive procedure, but they are less sensitive than individual litigants to the
qualitative aspects of the hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of
the outcomes it delivers. They attribute unfavorable outcomes to the judgment of the arbitrators, not to the lack of opportunity for discovery or for cross-examining witnesses, or to
the absence of other attributes of the trial process.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

litigant. Because delay often means more litigation costs 1 59 or settlement for a

lesser amount,' 60 delay could deny a small-claim litigant the opportunity for a
meaningful award, if not an award altogether. 161 By imposing a relatively short
time limit for the commencement of hearings under court-ordered arbitration,
the small-claim litigant's costs are reduced and a more just settlement may be
possible.162

The right to demand a trial de novo, present in all court-ordered arbitration
programs, 163 may provide a safeguard for litigants' rights.164 If a plaintiff or
defendant is dissatisfied with the award, either may appeal. Further, any case
heard in arbitration that involves unforeseen complexities or serves as an adjudication of public rights may be heard subsequently by a jury.' 65 The Pittsburgh
study, however, questioned whether litigants actually would file for a trial de
novo in the face of a monetary disincentive.' 6 6 Given the nature of the awards
in which neither plaintiffs nor defendants were clear winners, the researchers
speculated the program might ultimately deliver "reasonably acceptable" rather
67
than "just" decisions.'
Assuming court-ordered arbitration can ensure justice, it must also promote the expeditious resolution of claims and demonstrate cost savings to individual litigants and courts.1 68 Otherwise, court-ordered arbitration only serves
159. PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 31 (Table 1).
160. Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1814. Alschuler reasoned:
In short, when justice is delayed, high priced, or inaccessible, the de facto rule of liability in
negligence cases is not the Hand formula. It is the amount of the Hand Formula would
award multiplied by a fraction, and every increase in the cost of purchasing justice make
the fraction smaller.
Id.
161. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
162. See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1814. Whether a program will reduce delay and speed
disposition "depends on formal program rules and informal implementation practices." Hensler,
supra note 16, at 274. "When courts want to use arbitration to speed case disposition, when they
have the resources available to process cases efficiently, when they are not unduly constrained by
statutory or other formal limits on the speed of disposition, and when attorneys cooperate in making
the program work, arbitration can result in speedy case disposition." Id.
163. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 11.
164. See E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 4 (1977).

165. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 672-74. Edwards found that the greatest concern was the
possibility that an ADR process, divorced from the court system, could decide a public right. Id.
This fear does not exist in the court-ordered arbitration context, because arbitration is an adjunct to
the courts. Furthermore, these arbitration hearings decide mostly "private disputes" limited to
those below an established dollar ceiling. Id.
166. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 94. Although "policymakers feel that some financial
disincentives are necessary to discourage frivolous appeals from arbitration," "very little [is known]
about how the average litigant decides whether to appeal." Hensler, supra note 16, at 278.
167. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note I, at 94. Although this effect is certainly a possible outcome
worthy of evaluation by the North Carolina study, it might not be present in the pilot program for
several reasons. First, the ceiling amount is higher in North Carolina than in the Pittsburgh program. Second, the lower cost of appeal and a potentially different "legal culture" also could cause
North Carolina litigants to react differently.
168. See Hensler, supra note 16, at 272-76. Arbitration promises "simple, fast, and inexpensive
adjudication to litigants, and a means of reducing judicial workloads and controlling public expenditures for civil court administrators." SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note I, at I.
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to add one additional step to a complex adjudication system. 169 There are several potential benefits individual litigants and court systems can expect from the
use of court-ordered arbitration. Litigants may experience greater levels of satisfaction 170 as a result of expedited hearings and, as previously noted, may be
treated more fairly in settlement situations. Through a diversion of claims to a
17 1
more expeditious process, courts can begin to reduce backlog.
Preliminary data has suggested that court-ordered arbitration is a promising method to speed litigation in many cases. 172 In addition, courts with programs that have jurisdictional limits of $10,000 and above are able to divert
173
substantial portions of their caseload through arbitration.
Not all court-ordered arbitration programs, however, have produced this
outcome. Researchers found that in some California courts, for example, cases
in arbitration could "take slightly longer.., to reach an arbitration award than
to reach jury trial."' 174 Additional delays occurred in courts with uncongested

calendars as well. These delays occurred because statutory constraints mandated when a case could be assigned to arbitration.1 7 5 Arbitration caused addi-

tional delay in congested courts "that assign cases late in the pretrial
process."' 176 These delays apparently were caused by

the availability of judge time to assess case value, by statutory require-

ments that established relatively lengthy time intervals for different
stages of the process, by the practice of placing administrative control
over the hearing process in the arbitrators' hands, and by the lack of

court resources to monitor
the arbitrators' performance in carrying out
177

these responsibilites.
Additional investment of scarce resources, rather than "the diminution of court
169. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 53.
170. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 17 (discussing satisfaction in the
Washington arbitration program); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 ("most frequent

criticism of the judicial process is that it takes too long"). However, researchers of the Pittsburgh
program noted an interesting consequence of expeditious hearings. Litigants arrived when their
emotions over the dispute were still "running high," and were disappointed when the hearing did not
provide an opportunity to debate and confront their antagonists. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1,at
65.
171. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at xiii-xiv.
172. Hensler, supra note 16, at 274; see also E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at xv

("there is clear promise for court-annexed arbitration to expedite litigation for many cases").
173. FORUM, supra note 14, at 5. The extent of the diversion, as well as the speed with which
arbitration can process diverted cases, depends on the type and complexity of the cases involved. Id.
Speed of disposition in arbitration and incidence of diversion, which is based on jurisdictional factors, are different concepts. However, most programs tie the speed with which an arbitration hearing disposes of a case to the success of diversion. Thus, if the arbitration process is not significantly
faster than formal trial, less is gained by diversion. See Hensler, supra note 16, at 272-74. For a
discussion of issues involved in setting valuation and other jurisdictional matters, see P. EBENER,
supra note 39, at 51-54; E. LIND & J.SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 75; E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at

21-28.
174. D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
FIRST YEAR xiv (1981).

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Hensler, supra note 16, at 274.
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attention," was required to achieve speedy disposition when it did occur.' 78
To avoid the California dilemma and to produce expeditious outcomes,
court-ordered arbitration programs should be tightly administered by the court
or its agent. 179 One significant program feature requiring careful management is
the system for the selection of cases. 180 Although valuation and exclusion criteria determine the number of cases actually diverted, 18 the method utilized to

accomplish this diversion will affect disposition speed and cost.18 2 Self-selection
by attorneys or the use of clerical staff to assign cases can be fast and inexpen83
sive; judicial valuation and assignment involves delay and expense. 1

The most vital need for effective court supervision and administration is in
the scheduling of hearings.' 8 4 The court, through nonjudicial personnel, must

set and enforce limits on the scheduling of arbitration hearings. If it does not,
procrastination may occur and slow the pace of litigation to that of traditional
adjudication.18 5 By retaining full responsibility for setting hearing dates and by
attending to miscellaneous administrative details, the court can ensure that

claims are handled at a predetermined pace. In fully operational programs the
ability to realize expeditious hearings may depend on the availability of an adequate supply of arbitrators, as well as an efficient use of arbitrators' time while
they are serving.'

86

It is indisputable that significant cost savings from an expeditious claims
resolution process will benefit litigants, courts, and taxpayers. Although the for-

mal American judicial system delivers "a precise brand ofjustice," it does so at a
high price to litigants and courts. 187 Courts must pay large amounts for judicial
and administrative personnel to provide complex adjudication services.
Although the cost borne by litigants usually exceeds the public burden, many
litigants are faced with the unsatisfactory outcome of winning in court, yet los-

ing in the pocketbook. 188 Court-ordered arbitration may reduce these costs for
both litigants and courts. For instance, jury trials, which often are used in the
formal system, are much more expensive than the average cost of an arbitration
178. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 86-87.
179. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1,at 87. Researchers found that the Pittsburgh program
produced "extraordinarily rapid disposition of civil claims, without great expense to the taxpayers."
Id. The Pittsburgh program also practiced centralized, tight management. Id.
180. E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 21-28.
181. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 52-54.
182. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 54.
183. See P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 54; SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 88.
184. See E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 20-22 (discussing benefits of different types of court arbitration management models).
185. Levine, supra note 37, at 545. Attorney-arbitrators, if allowed to schedule hearings and
attend to incidental matters, will tend to continue hearings in order to accommodate colleagues,
SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 87.
186. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 87. The availability of attorneys for arbitrator duty
will be affected by multiple factors including experience criteria, the geographic location of the program, willingness of the bar to support the program, and compensation. Id. If arbitrators are going
to hear the maximum number of cases on the days they serve, court administration must ensure a
steady supply of cases. See id.
187. E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 164, at 77.
188. E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 164, at 4.
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hearing.18 9 Other cost reductions might include attorney's fees and other usual

costs, such as the cost of transcripts. 190
Data concerning the impact of court-ordered arbitration on litigant costs

are inconclusive. 19 1 For example, in the Pittsburgh program some attorneys

charged individual litigants an hourly fee or a flat fee per hearing. 192 These
litigants seemed to pay a reasonable amount in relation to their claims. 193 Other
attorneys, however, continued to charge their usual contingency percentage regardless of whether a case was diverted to arbitration. 194 Thus, cost savings
among litigants in a program may vary. Furthermore, this component of liti-

gant expense probably is determined by practices common to the local legal
culture. 195
Some courts have claimed that significant savings resulted from the use of

court-ordered arbitration. 196 Although the savings potential is suggested by em-

pirical data, 197 it has not been proven that state programs actually can realize
this potential. 198 Despite the inconclusive nature of prior efforts to examine the
outcome of court-ordered arbitration, however, these studies have generated
analyses sufficient for defining the issues that must be understood in order to
evaluate the ultimate success of court-ordered arbitration. 199

If courts are to realize savings from court-ordered arbitration, a significantly greater number of cases must be finally disposed of at arbitration hearings
than go on to trial. 2°° To encourage the acceptance of the arbitration award,

most programs incorporate disincentives to appeal, 20 1 but the effect of these de189. FORUM, supra note 14, at 5. The cost for a jury trial in 1982 ranged from $2,790 to $8,649
in state trial courts; nonjury trials cost roughly half this figure. James, The Cost of Civil Litigation, 22
JUDGES J. 24 (Spring 1983); see generally J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1982) (analyzing court expenditures for processing tort cases). It is unlikely that costs have
declined since 1982.
190. E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 164, at 4.
191. FORUM, supra note 14, at 5.
192. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 37-38. Some litigants incurred no costs, because insurance companies employed their attorneys. Id. at 38.
193. FORUM, supra note 14, at 5.
194. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 38.
195. For a discussion of research of lawyers' fees in the California, New Jersey, and Pittsburgh
programs, see Hensler, supra note 16, at 274-75.
196. See FORUM, supra note 14, at 3. According to Chief Justice Nix of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, "[s]ince a new arbitration center opened in Philadelphia in 1982, 48,500 cases were
disposed of by way of arbitration settlement at an estimated savings of more than $50 million." Id.
In its report on the effectiveness of judicial arbitration, the Judicial Counsel of California reported
positive effects on both court and litigant costs. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at
67.
197. See Hensler, supra note 16, at 273. Hensler summarizes data from studies conducted by the
Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice of court-ordered arbitration programs in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and California.
198. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 90-95; see also FORUM, supra note 14, at 5 (no
assessment possible of how well court-ordered arbitration saves taxpayers money until more information is available).
199. For an excellent summary of current court-ordered arbitration data, see Hensler, supra
note 16.
200. Levine, supra note 37, at 541.
201. Demand for a trial de novo is often referred to as an "appeal." See FORUM, supra note 14,
at 6. The appeal amounts to a rejection of the award.
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vices on the finality of awards is unclear. 20 2 Currently reported appeal rates
range from "the 20 percent level for many long-established programs to around
50 percent for some new programs ....-"203 However, data on appeal rates are
not a helpful measure of outcomes, because an appeal does not necessarily mean
2°4
the case will be tried.
Thorough analysis of outcomes in court-ordered arbitration must go beyond determining the incidence of cases appealed from arbitration that ultimately reach trial. 205 The "Acid Test" 20 6 for court-ordered arbitration may be
a comparison of the incidence of trial de novo with cases that regularly go to
trial. To make this comparison, it is necessary to determine the incidence of
trials of similar cases in the absence of the arbitration program. 20 7 A finding that
the incidence of trials de novo is equal to or greater than the incidence of actual
trials of similar cases in the regular trial track would raise serious questions
concerning the efficiency of a program. A higher incidence of trials de novo
would create increased demands on judicial time, and may indicate the program
costs more than regular adjudication. 20 8 A rate of trials de novo equal to the
trial rate of cases in the regular adjudication process may indicate that the court
system is absorbing the administrative costs for arbitration without the corre20 9
sponding benefits.
In addition, a thorough analysis of outcomes must help define the influences
that determine whether or not a case is tried de novo. 2 10 For example, two
factors may have a greater effect on the incidence of trials de novo than appeal
202. See P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 55-56. Appeal disincentives vary from program to program; research is needed to determine which disincentives, if any, decrease the incidence of trial de
novo. Some critics do not feel disincentives provide much deterrence. See, e.g., Levine, supra note

37, at 538.
203. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6. Apparently, the 50% appeal rates represent some programs on
the West Coast "where appealing seems to be more in style." Id. Lind and Shapard reported the
appeal rate in three federal programs as 60%. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at xiii.
204. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6. Similarly, inferences of cost savings based on the number of
cases resolved by arbitration are not particularly meaningful. Many cases that are arbitrated "would
never have been tried either at civil jury trials or bench trials." Id. at 5. Most civil cases settle before
reaching trial. Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge As a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE
257, 257 (1986). Actual trial figures may vary according to jurisdiction and the age of the program.
FORUM, supra note 14, at 6. The North Carolina Bar's Task Force Report found that "the frequency of requests for trials de novo usually varied between 10% and 30%." TASK FORcE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 19. This report noted that in the California program, the request for trial de novo
was 50%, but trial rates were below 10%. Id. For statistics from other programs, see id. at 29 n.37.
205. Levine, supra note 37, at 543.
206. FORUM, supra note 14, at 6; E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 91 (noting the
importance of gathering information on the effects of trials).
207. J. SHAPARD, UPDATED ANALYSIS OF COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1982), reprinted in E. LIND & J.SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 135. This
type of evaluation should also be utilized to study the effects on outcomes from a litigant's perspective. "The investigation would compare both the distribution of award dollars and plaintiffs' and
defendants' costs to litigate." SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 31.
208. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 93. Either an increase or a decrease in the
incidence of trials "would have consequences for the workload of judges and thus would be important for its influence not only on the expense of litigation in arbitration cases but also for the judicial
resources available for cases not subject to arbitration." Id.
209. See E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 32-34 (discussing court-related research questions).
210. FORUM, supra note 14, at 5 (understanding requires a "careful analysis" of cases that move
between arbitration and trial division).
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disincentives. 2 11 First, a disputant's belief in the fairness of the arbitration hear-

ing may be a decisive component of finality.2 12 In the Pittsburgh study fairness
did not correspond simply to winning or losing.2 13 Instead, the litigants' perceptions of fairness depended heavily on the ambience of the program, especially the
hearing.2 14 A litigant who "has her day in court" may be more inclined to
2 15
accept the arbitration outcome even if not totally satisfied with the award.
Second, settlement appears to play a large role in reducing the incidence of
trial de novo. 21 6 Court-ordered arbitration may serve to give parties an advisory verdict that forms the basis for a post-hearing settlement. 2 17 Some writers
view the arbitration hearing as primarily a forum to foster settlement. 218 Others

caution that excessive emphasis on settlement, rather than an adjudication of the
merits, undermines litigants' perception of the finality of hearings and increases
2 19
appeals.
Ultimately, the success of court- ordered arbitration will depend on the satisfaction levels of litigants, attorneys, and court personnel. 220 Although experiments with court-ordered arbitration are relatively recent, the procedure is
22 1
Past
merely one of a series of court reforms attempted during this century.
experience teaches that the implementation of a court reform involves more than
a mechanical application of new procedures by users and court 1erisonriel. In-

stead, implementation of reforms will require these groups to adjust to changes
in established patterns of interaction and uncertainties about how the system

will operate. 2 22 Individual users of court-ordered arbitration generally report a
211. Disincentives to appeal are not very strong in most programs, and stronger disincentives
may be unconstitutional. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 56. In the North Carolina program, for
example, the only disincentive to appeal is a possibility of having to pay the $75 arbitrator fee. See
N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 9.
212. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 91.
213. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 91. "Simply winning his case does not ensure that the
litigant will believe he has been treated fairly, nor does losing necessarily lead to a perception of
unfairness." Id.
214. See SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 91.
215. This acceptance based on fairness may occur only when small amounts are at stake in the
litigation. The higher the amount, the more likely an appeal. See Levine, supranote 37, at 543 n.29.
216. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at xiv; Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1840. Alschuler
writes: "Even litigants who do initially seek trial following arbitration commonly settle, and lawyers
report that the arbitrators' resolution of disputed issues has aided the settlement process." Alschuler, supra note 8, at 1840.
217. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 83-87. In their recommendations Lind and
Shapard urge arbitrators to enhance this process by providing more than a simple statement of the
award. Instead, arbitrators are encouraged to provide counsel a basis for negotiation and settlement.
Id. at 85.
218. See, e.g., E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 84.
219. Levine, supra note 37, at 541.
220. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 60; accord E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 34-35 (user satisfaction is crucial to a program's ultimate success).
221. See Glick, supra note 144, at 52-53 ("legal change in a modern society is a continuing
phenomenon," and "court reform has been an ongoing activity of bar leaders, prominent academics,
and organizations").
222. See Glick, supra note 144, at 17-31. The Ad Hoe Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public
Policy suggested that "[i]ncentives will have to be developed for lawyers and clients alike to ensure
the acceptance and use of alternatives to litigation." PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 20.
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high level of satisfaction. 223 Further, litigants tend to perceive arbitration pro224
grams as fair.
Attorneys, on the other hand, have voiced responses ranging from high ap-

proval 225 to mild support.22 6 On the whole, studies perceive attorneys as more
skeptical of the implementation of court-ordered arbitration programs. In some

jurisdictions attorneys are reported to "have contributed to [the] defeat of proposals to authorize programs.

'227

Whether or not these perceptions are true,

of an arbitration
there can be little doubt that the successful implementation
228

program depends on the support of the local bar.
The North Carolina pilot program appears to be a well-planned effort to

implement an alternative to traditional adjudication. As adopted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, this program incorporates positive features found in
other court-ordered arbitration efforts. These features should enhance the program's ability to achieve the objectives of court-ordered arbitration, assuming
the ADR process can be successful in some form or context.
An accurate understanding of the procedural and substantive justice litigants may expect in North Carolina's experiment must await the results of the
controlled study.22 9 Nevertheless, because the program embodies basic features
223. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 16-17 (reporting an 80% approval rate in
the Washington program); SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 61 (most litigants interviewed were
satisfied with the Pittsburgh program); Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 135, at 13 (reporting high
satisfaction level in the Rochester, New York program).
224. D. HENSLER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE STATE TRIAL COURT SYSTEM 11
(1984) (suggesting that most litigants find court-ordered arbitration fair); A. LIND & J. SHAPARD,
supra note 135, at 61.
225. P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 16. The Seattle, Washington program is
reported to have a 90% approval rate among attorneys. Id.
226. E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, supra note 135, at 77 (finding that counsel generally favored the
program, but not overwhelmingly so).
227. See P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, supra note 43, at 17.
228. P. EBENER, supra note 39, at 10; see Glick, supra note 144, at 23-26.
229. Based on the Middle District Program experience, the results of the pilot program's controlled experiment will not be available for some time. Although the Middle District Program
started on January 1, 1985, preliminary research findings were not available until December 19,
1986. Even after two years of program operation, the status report expressed uncertainties about the
program's consequences; these uncertainties about the program's consequences stemmed from "the
relatively small case samples available" and "the substantial proportion of cases not yet terminated."
E. Lind, Status Report to the Court: Current Findings of Research on the Program for CourtAnnexed Arbitration in the Middle District of North Carolina (Jan. 28, 1987).
The Status Report summarized the preliminary findings as follows:
* Itis unclear whether the arbitration program hastens case termination. Different ways
of approaching the question of early termination yield different answers, none of which
show a strong effect in favor of arbitration.
* Many cases are not reaching arbitration hearings within the timetable mandated by the
rules.
* The arbitration hearings are of substantial length, averaging nearly eight hours.
* The hearing process and arbitrators have received very high marks from attorneys and
litigants in arbitrated cases.
* The rate of demand for trial de novo appears to be stable at about 70%.
* Demands for trial de novo do not appear to lessen the positive reactions of counsel or
litigants to the arbitration process.
* There is a suggestion in the data, but not yet a clear finding, that the arbitration program
reduces the private costs of litigation.
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common to court-ordered arbitration, it is likely the program will provide litigants with the level of justice discernible in the Pittsburgh program. 230 Similar
to the Pittsburgh program, the North Carolina pilot program is centralized and
functions under court supervision. Case selection is monitored, and the North
Carolina Rules except cases that are not amenable to arbitration. 2 31 In addition,
the pilot program places importance on obtaining experienced arbitrators who
2 32
If outare obliged to conduct hearings in a dignified, authoritative manner.
comes should prove to be "reasonably acceptable" rather than "precisely just,"
this fact inevitably must be balanced against program advantages accruing to the
small- claim litigant. Finally, although no specific provisions of the North Carolina Rules address the plight of the pro se litigant, a duty to assist this type of
2 33
disputant has been recognized.
North Carolina's court-ordered arbitration program also incorporates characteristics that may lead to cost efficiency and a quick pace for hearings. First,
although attorneys are permitted to value their own cases, the experiment provides for the tightly controlled administration of case selection and scheduling of
hearings by arbitration coordinators. 234 In addition to ensuring that hearings
are set within the time limits stipulated by the rules, these coordinators also
relieve the arbitrators of miscellaneous details that could be a source of inefficiency or procrastination. 235 The North Carolina Rules limit the time for dis236
covery and contain provisions for expediting testimony.
Second, the North Carolina program incorporates features to promote the
finality of hearing awards. The North Carolina Rules require the use of experienced attorneys as arbitrators. 2 37 In addition, the North Carolina Bar Association has emphasized that arbitrators should conduct hearings that give the
litigants the perception of "having their day in court."' 238 Creating this perception of finality is important, because the appeal disincentive in the pilot program
is minimal.
Third, a basic component of the North Carolina program is a rigorous evaluation. 239 Through evaluation, planners and administrators are able to make
24°
adjustments in the program design aimed at achieving maximum efficiency.
In addition, data on outcomes can be used to guard against trading justice for
speed and cost savings.
* Counsel and litigants are very favorable indeed in their opinions of the program.
Id.
230. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
231. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. l(a)(1)-(7), 319 N.C. Appendix at 1; see supra notes 73-82 and
accompanying text.
232. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 3.
233. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 5; see supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
235. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 2.
236. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
237. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2(b), 319 N.C. Appendix at 3. The North Carolina Bar Association also provides training for the designated arbitrators in the three judicial districts.
238. BENCHBOOK, supra note 83, at 3.
239. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
240. E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 42.
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Despite these positive features of the North Carolina program, several potential problems also must be considered. First, although court-ordered arbitration has met with some success in other localities, there is no guarantee that the
success of the ADR process is transferable. 24 1 Arbitration programs are
uniquely shaped by the objectives sought in a particular jurisdiction and by the
242
contours of the local legal culture.
Second, the North Carolina program requires a high level of arbitrator experience, yet provides only token compensation. In addition, the projected time
commitment of one hour per hearing may be a low estimate. Therefore, the
success of the North Carolina program depends not only on its general acceptance by the bar, but also on the extensive pro bono investment of individual bar
members.
Third, the designers of the state program chose not to incorporate into the
pilot program the postaward settlement conference required in the Middle District program. If research confirms that a major benefit of court-ordered arbitration is the stimulation of settlement, the state program may be lacking a vital
component.
As with the introduction of any ADR program, there is the risk that courtordered arbitration will be viewed as a panacea for all of North Carolina's litigation woes. 24 3 By itself, court-ordered arbitration cannot solve the tremendous
problems facing the court system. 244 However, as part of a more comprehensive
ADR package, court-ordered arbitration may be one weapon to combat the current problems endemic to the American system of justice. 24 5
WILLIAM KINSLAND EDVARDS

241. Bedlin & Nejelski, supra note 135, at 10.
242. E. ROLPH, supra note 48, at 70.
243. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 668.
244. SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 94-96.
245. The North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Bar Association appear committed to pursuing a comprehensive ADR package. In late June 1987 Chief Justice James Exum
convened a meeting of attorneys, trial court administrators, and judges from Buncombe, Wake, and
Mecklenburg Counties to develop a procedure for conducting summary jury trials in these counties
on an experimental basis. The experimental period lasted from July to December 1987; five summary jury trials were conducted successfully. Jan. Laney Interview, supra note 18. For a discussion
of summary jury trials in North Carolina, see NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION DISPUTE REsOLUTION COMMITTEE, INTRODUCING SUMMARY JURY TRIALS TO THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE

SUPERIOR COURTS (1987). Summary jury trials involve a summarized presentation of a civil case to
an advisory jury for the purpose of showing the parties how a jury reacts to the dispute in an effort to
promote settlement. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An AlternativeMethod of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286, 286 (1986). The procedure is nonbinding unless otherwise agreed by the
parties. Id.

